The Polish President’s recent controversial visit to Hungary has been widely criticized among conservatives circles, while praised and exploited for propaganda purposes among the European left. It turns out, not only Hungarians, but some Czechs and Slovaks are not impressed by President Nawrocki’s foreign policy decisions either. Read Maciej Szymanowski’s analysis on the state of Polish-Hungarian relationship. Mr. Szymanowski is the former Director of the Warsaw Wacław Felczak Polish–Hungarian Cooperation Institute.
“Lack of realism, reluctance to plan, extreme intentions, impulsive decisions, outdated assumptions, subjective attitudes, flawed form, careless execution, resentment, and complexes” – this is how Tadeusz Kozłowski, a pre-war diplomat, characterized the foreign policy of the Second Polish Republic in his book, published in 1964 while in exile in Argentina. Reading these words, an objective or impartial foreign observer would probably get the impression that this is rather a description of contemporary Polish foreign policy.
Against this background, how do the visits made in recent weeks by President Karol Nawrocki to Bratislava, Prague, and Esztergom look? The refusal to visit Budapest? The future of the Visegrad Group and Central European cooperation in general – in times of war beyond our eastern borders and revolutionary changes taking place in the European Union? At a time of intense but unsuccessful efforts by the Polish government to secure a seat at the table where the fate of Ukraine is being decided? Which, let us face it, is only a foretaste of how difficult it will be for Polish companies to participate effectively in the post-war reconstruction program of this country, which must come into effect – and will come into effect, because no one sensible, and certainly not on the Potomac, will risk the absence of a “Marshall Plan,” as happened in Europe after the Great War – with the well-known consequences.
Maciej Szymanowski. Photo: Courtesy of Maciej Szymanowski
But let us start ab ovo – from the beginning, as the Romans used to say. Founded in 1991, the Visegrad Group, consisting of three countries, and after the breakup of Czechoslovakia, four countries, namely Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary, aimed to “deepen cooperation between these countries, initially in particular on issues related to accession to the European Union and NATO”. Above all, however, it must be added that the V4 was intended to guarantee that the cardinal mistake of the interwar period, namely the quarreling of virtually everyone with everyone else in Central Europe, would not be repeated.
For example, when Czechoslovakia, together with Romania and Yugoslavia, tried to destroy Hungary, and in turn the governments in Warsaw financed the communist party in their southern neighbor, counting on the “positive” effects of its anarchism and anti-state sentiment. Although the V4 went through various periods during its long history, with sometimes better and sometimes worse cooperation, it was in itself an emanation of the political maturity of its member states. What is more, the Visegrad Group, whose leaders since 2010 have most often met in the V4 plus format, inviting other countries to cooperate according to current needs, was an association that others had to reckon with, whether they liked it or not. This was the case in 2016, when it successfully opposed the EU’s plan for the forced relocation of illegal immigrants from outside Europe among EU member states.
Hungarian President Katalin Novák (L to R), Polish President Andrzej Duda, Czech President Petr Pavel and Slovak President Zuzana Caputová at the meeting of the heads of state of the Visegrad Group (V4) in Prague in 2023. Photo: MTI/Bruzák Noémi
If we take a look at the Visegrad cooperation program adopted at the summit of prime ministers in Krakow (2021), we can see how incredibly broad the scope of inter-state cooperation was at the time: from security issues, including policy towards Russia and Ukraine, through a common policy on various EU programs, to trade and infrastructure investments in the region, to scientific and educational programs.
The pandemic, i.e., the long period of no direct meetings and talks between the leaders of the V4 countries, followed by the Russian Federation’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine—more specifically, differences in approach to the scope of military aid (not humanitarian aid, not border issues!) which was intensively highlighted, especially in Poland for domestic political reasons, effectively paralyzed the V4’s activities. As a result, instead of moving towards the institutionalization of regional cooperation, the “political monetization” of the V4, as the Benelux countries and the Scandinavian countries did long ago, whose interests in the war-related negotiations between Russia and Ukraine have been well represented by Helsinki in recent months, Visegrad cooperation has died out.
A great example of this is the recent lack of activity—apart from a few programs by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and continued funding for the Visegrad Fund (IVF)—during the Polish presidency of the V4 (2024/2025).
It is as if Poland, at the level of prime ministers or ministers, currently has no significant issues to discuss, no need for support, and no need for a friendly atmosphere in the region to build greater effectiveness on the international stage.
This is probably why there have not been such openly formulated expectations in Bratislava, Budapest, or Prague towards Warsaw for a long time, as was the case at the time of Karol Nawrocki’s election victory and the announcement of reciprocal visits to the capitals of the Visegrad countries and the V4 summit convened by the Hungarian presidency.
When asked by the newspaper Do Rzeczy how President Nawrocki’s visit to Bratislava went, Jozef Majchrák, deputy editor-in-chief of the Postoj daily, who specializes in Polish and Central European affairs, replied briefly: “It was successful. Mainly because it took place. It was the first official visit by a high-ranking politician from Poland since Robert Fico’s government came to power [October 2023]. Until then, there had only been a strange, unofficial meeting between Fico and Tusk in Tatranská Jasná.
Therefore, there was a feeling in Slovakia that Warsaw was ignoring us. Just like Hungary.
Nawrocki’s visit changed this situation because the Polish president made a distinction between Slovakia and Hungary in terms of their position on Ukraine. He stated that he did not think Slovakia had a significantly different policy towards Ukraine than Poland. On the other hand, Slovakia probably expected that this visit would give a greater impetus to the revival of the V4, but this was not clear from Nawrocki’s statements.
In a similar vein, Jaroslav Daniška, editor-in-chief of the Marker.sk news portal, commented on the same question: “The visit to Bratislava was a success. Since the Polish government blocked the V4, the Visegrad Group has not been functioning. Nawrocki arrived with a smile and a vision of cooperation with Ukraine that is close to our hearts. He did not demonize Prime Minister Fico or portray him as a pro-Russian politician, which he is not. It is important that he has a realistic view of the European Union. The left-liberal media tried to marginalize Nawrocki’s visit, but since Tusk has no time for Bratislava and Sikorski has no desire to visit, Nawrocki has thus become a key figure for further Polish-Slovak relations.”
Vít Dostál, director of the AMO International Policy Association in Prague, summarized the president’s visit to Prague on November 24 as follows: “The visit went well. And most importantly, it happened. Apart from Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine, we became the last neighbor of Poland to be visited. The president’s lecture at Charles University did not cause much of a stir. Apart from the reactions of various loudmouths who apparently did not understand the speech and often distorted its content in their reactions. Overall impression: the presidents will find common ground.”
While relations were tense, former Polish President Duda has maintained his professional decorum in Polish-Hungarian relations. President Tamás Sulyok (L) with Andrzej Duda in Poland in 2024. Photo: MTI/Sándor-palota/Érdi Róbert
In fact, President Nawrocki’s lecture on Poland’s vision of the European Union would probably have been more appropriate in a capital city other than Prague, such as Berlin or Brussels.
Its Czech participants are probably still wondering why there was no mention of the Visegrad Group, even though there was room for a reference to Africa. Jaroslav Kuchyňa, a lecturer at CEVRO University and analyst, draws attention to an equally important aspect of the visit to Prague: “The presidential office invited Karol Nawrocki to the Czech Republic too late. Far too late! The visit took place at the worst possible time, when there is still no new government. Prague is trying hard to win Bratislava’s favor, forgetting the need to pursue Central European realpolitik. It is not Bratislava, but Warsaw that should be the number one partner in the region. And if Warsaw, then above all Nawrocki.”
The president’s next stop on his trip around Central Europe was the V4 presidents’ summit in Esztergom, Hungary (December 3), after which nothing was signed or issued in the form of a joint statement, thus automatically classifying the meeting as “it happened, and the most important thing is that it happened.” This was all the more so because the summit was dominated in the media by Karol Nawrocki’s bilateral visit to Budapest, which had been canceled a few days earlier, which came as a considerable surprise. At least on the Danube. By everyone, in fact.
Left-wing and liberal parties and circles, especially those that are anti-American, treated the Polish president’s decision as a gift from heaven.
After all, Hungarians have been pro-Polish for centuries, and parliamentary elections are taking place in the spring, in which the ruling coalition of Fidesz and the Christian Democratic KDNP will find it difficult to defend their position, if only because of the so-called high prices, i.e., even higher than in Poland, a price shock related to the Green Deal and the costs of diversifying energy sources in recent years.
In right-wing circles, the surprise was tinged with consternation and the need for ad hoc rationalization, as exemplified by an article published in Magyar Hirlap on the day of the V4 presidential summit, devoted, according to the newspaper, to the top priority of Polish foreign policy, a cross-party agreement on the “desire to revive Greater Poland in the form of a confederation with Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine.” An absurd statement? Yes. But it also demonstrates an inability to understand the situation.
After all, Prime Minister Orbán’s visit to Moscow (given as the reason for the bilateral visit not taking place) was intended to confirm Russia’s reduced involvement – in favor of the Americans – in the expansion and modernization of the nuclear power plant in Paks. (The talks also focused on the possible entry of MOL into markets that are apparently of no interest to Orlen, i.e., Romania, Bulgaria, and Serbia, in connection with the US ultimatum against the assets of the Russian company Lukoil, which expires on December 13 this year).
In short, the Polish president had no problem visiting Bratislava and Prague, countries which, like Hungary, continue to benefit greatly from Russian oil, oil products, and gas (LNG) supplies. If Hungary is an exception in this regard, it is only because it speaks openly about it.
Like few other NATO countries, it has actually started investing in its defense industry after 2022. And like few others, it formally and in practice treats Central European cooperation as a key priority in its foreign policy.
“We, the citizens of Central Europe, must arrange our lives ourselves. Others have already tried to do so: the Turks, the Habsburgs, the Germans, and the Russians. Today, there would also be those willing to do so. But we also know that uninvited help usually does not lead to anything good. If life in Central Europe is organized by outsiders, it will lead to divisions, hostility, and subordination, and the benefits of our fantastic resources, our valuable work, and our global intellectual achievements will be reaped by others, who will accumulate them for themselves and use them to strengthen their power.” It is worth quoting this passage from one of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s speeches in 2020, because it aptly characterizes the situation in which Visegrad Europe, one of the fastest growing regions in the world in terms of economic and educational development (see: PISA test results), not only in Europe (tripling its per capita wealth in a single generation). Where hard power lags behind soft power. Where the principle of “divide and rule,” now known as the Putinum mechanism of negation, is in full swing, using blunt artificial intelligence algorithms in the media. To quote Comrade Stalin: “Whoever is not with us is against us.”
In reality, the world and international politics are not based on simple dichotomies. It is a world of interests, which, for example, in Polish political and media reality, requires us to reflect on Donald Trump’s presidency as a “time of chaos” rather than on the game theory, almost as old as the world itself, scientifically developed almost a century ago by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, based on showing partners possible mutual benefits.
The Former Wacław Felczak Institute in Warsaw, shut down by the Donald Tusk government. Photo: Wikipedia
In a very interesting speech given last week by Zsolt Németh, long-time chairman of the parliamentary foreign affairs committee, on the occasion of the Hungarian publication of Prof. Jan Draus’s (nevertheless) interesting book “Understanding Geopolitics: Germany – Russia – Central Europe,” noteworthy words were spoken, or rather an analysis was formulated that could be titled: Cui prodest – who benefits from fueling conflicts in Central Europe? In short, the analysis points out that the period of peace and cooperation after 1989 proved to be more than beneficial for all Central European countries. It enabled them to make a civilizational leap forward. To put it bluntly, it enabled countries and citizens to get rich quickly. Without closing our eyes to reality, of course. In the end, the so-called VAT carousels of global retail chains have only been partially curbed in the region, and only in Slovakia. However, as virtually all international public opinion polls show, it is the Central European societies that continue to have their feet firmly on the ground, which seems to have even found expression in the new US National Security Strategy.
What are we lacking and what really disqualifies us as fully-fledged sovereign European states? An inferiority complex. And recently, which is particularly evident in the case of Poland, unfortunately, a lack of willingness to formulate specific programs of mutual cooperation.
On February 15 next year, on the 35th anniversary of the establishment of the Visegrad Group, which put its member states on the “fast track” to NATO and EU membership, functioning for many years thereafter as the hard core of Central European cooperation (see: Trimarium, B9, etc.), the hejnał – from the Hungarian hajnal – dawn, will sound again in Krakow. And at noon, bells will ring in Poland and throughout the Christian world. Exactly as Pope Callixtus III wished when he established a holiday in honor of the victorious battle fought by the forces of the Kingdom of Hungary near Belgrade (1456), which stopped Ottoman expansion in Europe for generations. At the same time, on February 15, 2026, we will find out, based on a simple attendance list at the celebrations at the castle in Visegrád and in Budapest, who is committed to Central European cooperation and who prefers the idea of divide et impera.
Maciej Szymanowski is a lecturer at the Eastern European Studies Department of the University of Warsaw.
Featured Image: X Sulyok Tamás
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